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DEFINING THE OFFICE: 
JOHN MARSHALL AS CHIEF JUSTICE 
CHARLES F. HOBSON† 
Credit for making the United States Supreme Court a significant 
player in the American scheme of government has been attributed to 
the masterful leadership of John Marshall, Chief Justice of the United 
States from 1801 to 1835.  By the latter year, the Supreme Court had 
acquired a kind of parity with Congress and the Executive that it did 
not possess in 1801.  Central to this development was the Court’s ap-
propriation of the Constitution as its special preserve.  Marshall and 
his brethren built up the Court’s institutional strength by successfully 
asserting a claim to expound the Constitution and apply it as law in 
the ordinary course of adjudication.  Although the Chief Justice’s con-
tribution to this enterprise far exceeded his proportional share as a 
single Justice, scholarship has long since exploded the myth of a he-
roic Marshall who dominated the Supreme Court by the sheer force of 
his individual genius and will.  Such a myth ignores the historical real-
ity that Marshall’s success as Chief Justice resulted from the interplay 
between his exceptional leadership abilities and the peculiar circum-
stances of time and place that allowed those abilities to flourish and 
have effect.  “A great man,” Oliver Wendell Holmes famously said, 
“represents a great ganglion in the nerves of society, or, to vary the 
figure, a strategic point in the campaign of history, and part of his 
greatness consists in his being there.”1  Marshall, in short, was the right 
man in the right place at the right time. 
I.  MARSHALL’S BACKGROUND AND PERSONAL QUALITIES 
Marshall brought with him a sterling résumé acquired as a soldier, 
state legislator, lawyer, diplomat, member of Congress, and secretary 
of state.  Indeed, his life and career prior to 1801 seemed specially de-
signed to prepare him for the office of Chief Justice of the United 
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States.  As a Continental Army officer who saw combat during the War 
of Independence, Marshall experienced firsthand the privations and 
sufferings of his fellow soldiers and gained a visceral understanding of 
the meaning of a weak central government.  In the crucible of war, 
the future Chief Justice forged the nationalist principles and beliefs 
that he carried with him through life.  The war also marked him for 
life as a member of the special fraternity of Revolutionary veterans, to 
which many of his fellow Justices also belonged.  The camaraderie of a 
“band of brothers” formed no small part of the bond uniting the 
Chief Justice and his associates.2
After the war, as a legislator and lawyer, Marshall pursued what 
amounted to an advanced course in public and constitutional law.  
Most important was his service in the Virginia ratification convention 
of 1788, a brilliant assembly whose debates constituted the most ex-
haustive contemporary examination of the Constitution next to The 
Federalist.  His presence in the company of such luminaries as James 
Madison, Patrick Henry, and George Mason at this defining and clari-
fying constitutional moment left an indelible mark.  It impressed him 
with a deep conviction that the Constitution decisively broke with the 
past by establishing a national government to replace a league of sov-
ereign states.  At the same time he recognized that antifederalism was 
by no means a spent political force but would continue to pose a for-
midable challenge to his own understanding of the constitutional set-
tlement of 1788.3
During the 1790s, Marshall emerged as an occasional but effective 
advocate for the Federalist administrations of George Washington and 
John Adams.  Most notable in this regard was his defense of the con-
stitutionality of the controversial commercial treaty with Great Britain 
(the Jay Treaty) while serving in the Virginia legislature in 1795.4  
Soon after, he made his only appearance as a lawyer in the Supreme 
Court, representing Virginia debtors in the “British debts” case of 
Ware v. Hylton.5  He lost, but he acquitted himself well by demonstrat-
ing a mastery of the law of nations and skill in constitutional argumen-
2 R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY:  STATESMAN OF THE 
OLD REPUBLIC 82 (1985); JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL:  DEFINER OF A 
NATION 395, 402-04 (1996). 
3 CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE:  JOHN MARSHALL AND THE RULE 
OF LAW 4 (Wilson Carey McWilliams & Lance Banning eds., 1996); SMITH, supra note 2, 
at 142-43. 
4 SMITH, supra note 2, at 180-81. 
5 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). 
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tation.  He further demonstrated his expertise in the law of nations in 
1797 and 1798 on a diplomatic mission to France.  His dispatches de-
fending American honor and dignity against the insulting behavior of 
the French catapulted him to the status of national hero.6  Marshall’s 
greatest forensic effort prior to becoming Chief Justice was his speech 
to Congress in March 1800 defending the President’s extradition 
power under the treaty with Great Britain.7  This speech displayed the 
qualities of a judicial pronouncement in the “grand style” that became 
Marshall’s hallmark.  President Adams brought Marshall soon thereaf-
ter into his cabinet as secretary of state.  During his brief tenure in 
that office, Marshall further distinguished himself with a statement of 
American foreign policy whose magisterial tone and clear expression 
were characteristic of his great decisions.8  In nominating Marshall to 
be Chief Justice in January 1801, Adams selected a person whose mas-
tery of public and constitutional law gained him the immediate re-
spect and deference of his fellow Justices.  Already a statesman of 
great renown, Marshall raised the Court’s prestige from the moment 
he donned the robe. 
Along with a wealth of experience, Marshall possessed attributes 
of intellect, learning, and personality that were ideally suited to lead-
ing a small assemblage of individual Justices and molding them into a 
collective entity that spoke with a single authoritative voice.  He had a 
first-class mind, with keen powers of logic, analysis, and generalization 
that enabled him to master complex legal issues with quick and dis-
cerning comprehension.  On first encountering the Chief Justice in 
1808, Joseph Story observed a “vigorous and powerful” intelligence, 
who “examines the intricacies of a subject with calm and persevering 
circumspection, and unravels the mysteries with irresistible acute-
ness.”9  Two decades spent in close company as the Chief Justice’s as-
sociate only confirmed this first impression.  “In strength, and depth, 
6 For a discussion of Marshall’s mission to France and his ensuing hero’s welcome 
home, see SMITH, supra note 2, at 192-237. 
7 John Marshall, Speech in the House of Representatives of the United States 
(Mar. 7, 1800), reprinted in 4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 82 (Charles T. Cullen ed., 
1984) [hereinafter 4 MARSHALL PAPERS]. 
8 See Letter from John Marshall to Rufus King (Sept. 20, 1800), in 4 MARSHALL 
PAPERS, supra note 7, at 283 (conveying concerns regarding British aggression); see also 
SMITH, supra note 2, at 273-74 (analyzing this letter). 
9 Letter from Joseph Story to Samuel P.P. Fay, Esq. (Feb. 25, 1808), in 1 LIFE AND 
LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 166, 167 (William W. Story ed., 1851) [hereinafter LIFE AND 
LETTERS]. 
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and comprehensiveness of mind,” Story wrote in Marshall’s eulogy, “it 
would be difficult to name his superior.”10
Marshall’s effectiveness as a leader did not depend on being the 
most learned lawyer on the Court; that honor clearly went to Story, 
who was a one-man publishing industry of legal treatises and commen-
taries.  Marshall, to be sure, possessed a knowledge of legal science 
equal to his high judicial station, but his peculiar strength was mastery 
of general principles rather than “technical, or recondite learning.”11  
As Story wrote, Marshall “loved to expatiate upon the theory of equity; 
to gather up the expansive doctrines of commercial jurisprudence; 
and to give a rational cast even to the most subtile dogmas of the 
common law.”12  Confident enough in his own abilities and knowl-
edge, he could more than hold his own with those of greater learning.  
He was not afraid to admit ignorance, to seek enlightenment from the 
lawyers who argued in his courtroom and from colleagues who sat 
with him on the bench.  Indeed, an engaging intellectual humility al-
lowed Marshall to turn his lack of “juridical learning” to his advantage 
by acknowledging and deferring to his colleagues’ superior knowl-
edge.13  He earned their trust and respect not by flattery or cajolery 
but by a genuine desire to draw on their particular expertise.  This 
had the desired effect of making each associate feel as if his views mat-
tered, as if he were an integral part of a common enterprise. 
Marshall’s abundant charm, sociability, kindness, and unaffected 
modesty also served him well.  At his behest, the Justices lodged to-
gether during Term time.  In this informal boardinghouse setting that 
seamlessly mixed official business with the pleasures of social life, 
Marshall enjoyed the full play of his captivating personality.  Having 
grown up as the oldest of fifteen children, Marshall was predisposed 
toward moderation and accommodation, to being agreeable, and will-
ing to suppress his individual will in the interests of achieving familial 
harmony.  These qualities proved useful in managing his “family” of 
brother Justices. 
Marshall was also blessed with a robust physical constitution, 
formed from a rugged, active youth spent in the salubrious climate of 
the Virginia Piedmont and strengthened from military service during 
10 Joseph Story, Life, Character, and Services of Chief Justice Marshall, in THE 
MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 639, 685 (William W. Story ed., Boston, 
Charles C. Little & James Brown, 1852). 
11 Id. at 693. 
12 Id. at 693-94. 
13 Id. at 693. 
 
2006] DEFINING THE OFFICE 1425 
 
the War of Independence.  He carried with him through life the hab-
its and discipline of a soldier.  He remained the light infantry officer, 
the veteran of the camp and march, who could endure the hardship 
and discomfort of travel, often in primitive conditions.  Supreme 
Court Justices in those days traveled frequently and far, not only sit-
ting in Washington, but also holding circuit courts throughout the 
country.  Marshall’s circuit took him to Raleigh, North Carolina, twice 
a year.  Life on the road took its toll on the Justices’ health, but Mar-
shall seemed to thrive on it. 
Marshall literally was always there, never missing a Supreme Court 
Term in thirty-five years.  He was almost always the first Justice to ar-
rive in Washington.  Except for being laid up nearly two weeks by an 
injury from a fall during the 1824 Term, he never missed a day in 
court.  He arrived a few days late for the 1830 Term because of his at-
tendance at the Virginia Convention of 1829.  During the 1826 Term 
he “had a pretty severe attack of the influenza,” which did not keep 
him from attending court.14  Until his death, Marshall’s most serious 
health crisis occurred in the fall of 1831, when he underwent surgery 
in Philadelphia for the removal of bladder stones.  The operation was 
a complete success, and he recovered in time to hold his November 
circuit in Richmond.15  In 1833, Story reported that the venerable 
Chief Justice, then seventy-seven, was “in excellent health, never bet-
ter, and as firm and robust in mind as in body.”16  His daily routine 
during Term time was to rise early and walk several miles before get-
ting down to business at an hour early enough that his colleagues 
might still be fast asleep.17  Not until 1835 did Marshall show obvious 
signs of physical decline, though his intellectual powers remained in-
tact.  Clearly, his physical and mental vigor enabled him to perform at 
the highest level in court, conference, and those solitary morning 
hours spent reading the day’s cases and writing opinions. 
Given the daunting challenge that faced him in 1801, Marshall’s 
acceptance of his commission bespoke confidence that he was up to 
14 Letter from John Marshall to Mary W. Marshall (Feb. 12, 1826), in 10 THE 
PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 273, 273 (Charles F. Hobson ed., 2000) [hereinafter 10 
MARSHALL PAPERS]. 
15 12 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 105, 105-09 (Charles F. Hobson ed., forth-
coming 2006) [hereinafter 12 MARSHALL PAPERS]. 
16 Letter from Joseph Story to Charles Sumner (Feb. 6, 1833), in 2 LIFE AND 
LETTERS, supra note 9, at 119, 120. 
17 Letter from John Marshall to Mary W. Marshall (Mar. 7, 1830), in 11 THE 
PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 353, 353 (Charles F. Hobson ed., 2002) [hereinafter 11 
MARSHALL PAPERS]. 
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the job and aspiration to achieve renown as a jurist comparable, say, 
to that of Lord Mansfield, the great English judge.  Marshall fused 
personal ambition and desire for fame with the institutional potential 
of the Supreme Court and the office of Chief Justice.  He was imbued 
with a sense of mission to make judicial power an effective instrument 
of governance in the federal system established by the Constitution.  
This animating higher purpose no doubt served him well in motivat-
ing his associates and instilling an institutional esprit de corps. 
II.  THE MARSHALL COURT 
Over the course of thirty-five years, Chief Justice Marshall re-
mained while other Justices came and went.  He had to adjust to 
changes resulting from personnel turnover and shifting political cir-
cumstances.  The Marshall Court falls into three more or less distinct 
periods:  (1) a first decade of “crisis” followed by gradual accommoda-
tion; (2) the “golden years” from 1811 to about 1824, in which the 
Court reached its peak as a champion of constitutional nationalism; 
and (3) a final decade of partial retreat and accommodation in re-
sponse to states’ rights opposition to federal power and a new political 
order represented by Jacksonian democracy. 
A.  The Marshall Court, 1801-1810 
Marshall joined a Court consisting entirely of Federalists, who re-
mained in the majority until 1810.  During his first four years the 
Chief and his brethren were embroiled in conflict with the admini-
stration of Thomas Jefferson.  This was the so-called “judiciary crisis,” 
featuring, among other episodes, the enactment of a judiciary act by 
the expiring Federalist Congress early in 1801, the repeal of that act 
by the new Republican Congress in 1802, and the “mandamus case” of 
Marbury v. Madison18 in 1803.  The ways in which Chief Justice Mar-
shall led the Court through this critical period set the tone and estab-
lished patterns that persisted throughout his tenure. 
The prospects for the federal judiciary were scarcely auspicious in 
1801.  In the high political excitement accompanying the Republican 
electoral victory, the judiciary had become the focal point of the victo-
rious party’s resentment and mistrust.  Memories were fresh of the 
federal courts’ vigorous enforcement of the Adams administration’s 
efforts to suppress internal dissent during the war crisis of 1798-1799, 
18 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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most conspicuously in prosecuting, fining, and jailing Republican 
newspaper editors on indictments brought under the notorious Sedi-
tion Act.19  Federal judges had also rendered themselves obnoxious by 
delivering grand jury charges that intemperately denounced opposi-
tion to government and exhorted the citizenry to support the admini-
stration’s policies.20  In the eyes of Republicans, the judiciary had re-
linquished all semblance of independence and impartiality and had 
become a tool of the executive and an instrument of party politics.21
Marshall’s immediate goal in 1801 was to repair the federal judici-
ary’s damaged reputation by making a strategic retreat from the ag-
gressive, partisan posture it had lately exhibited.  The change of ad-
ministration made such a retreat advisable, and happily for this 
purpose the new Chief Justice was a man of prudence and moderate 
political temperament.  However, things got worse before they got 
better.  At the very moment that Marshall was confirmed as Chief Jus-
tice, the lame-duck Federalist Congress passed a judiciary act creating 
a host of new federal circuit court judgeships, which were promptly 
filled by Adams’s appointees.  Republicans cried foul at what ap-
peared to be a brazen attempt by the defeated party to perpetuate its 
control of government through the judiciary.22  Shortly thereafter, a 
Federalist-appointed justice of the peace for the District of Columbia 
sued for a writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court for delivery of his 
commission, which had been withheld by the Jefferson administra-
tion.  Taken together, these events brought the judiciary to the brink 
of crisis, creating a severe test for the new Chief Justice. 
In December 1801, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the man-
damus action brought by William Marbury and assigned the case to be 
argued during the next Term.  Three months later, irritated by what it 
perceived to be an unwarranted judicial intrusion into executive mat-
ters, the Republican majority in Congress secured the repeal of the 
Judiciary Act of 1801.  The repeal and a subsequent judiciary act 
adopted in April 1802 restored the former system by which circuit 
courts were composed of Supreme Court Justices and judges of the 
United States district courts.  This new legislation also provided for an 
19 WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC:  THE CHIEF 
JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 165-69 (1995). 
20 Id. at 126-29. 
21 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 163-65 
(1926). 
22 Charles F. Hobson, John Marshall, the Mandamus Case, and the Judiciary Crisis, 
1801-1803, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 289, 291-92 (2003). 
 
1428 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 154: 1421 
 
annual Term of the Supreme Court, commencing the first Monday in 
February.  Consequently, the Court would not meet again until Feb-
ruary 1803, when Marbury’s case was to be argued.23
Before that case could be heard, the Supreme Court Justices in 
the spring of 1802 faced a dilemma:  should they hold the circuit 
courts established by the recent legislation?  By attending their cir-
cuits, they would signify their acquiescence to Congress’s authority to 
reinstate circuit riding by Supreme Court Justices.  Chief Justice Mar-
shall himself doubted the constitutionality of the measure, believing 
that Supreme Court Justices could not perform circuit duty without 
separate and distinct commissions as circuit judges.  Unable to consult 
personally with his brethren because of the postponement of the 
Court’s next Term, Marshall initiated a correspondence with Justices 
William Paterson, William Cushing, Bushrod Washington, and Samuel 
Chase.24  In these letters, Marshall set forth his doubts, while adding 
that it was “my duty & my inclination in this as in all other cases to be 
bound by the opinion of the majority of the Judges.”25  Upon learning 
that a majority of the Justices considered this question to be fully set-
tled by the practice of riding circuit from 1789 to 1801, the Chief Jus-
tice readily assented, remarking that “policy dictates this decision to us 
all.”26
The Justices averted a showdown by attending their circuit courts 
in the fall of 1802.  They further demonstrated their intention not to 
become instruments of party politics by steadfastly resisting attempts 
by Federalist lawyers to deny the authority of the courts to hear cases 
continued from the former circuit courts established under the re-
pealed 1801 act.  One such attempt occurred in Marshall’s own circuit 
in Richmond in December 1802, when a defendant pleaded that the 
Judiciary Act of 1802 was unconstitutional and void.  The Chief Justice 
rejected this plea in the case of Stuart v. Laird,27 which was appealed to 
the Supreme Court and argued during the February 1803 Term.  In a 
23 Id. at 294-96. 
24 Id. at 296-97. 
25 Letter from John Marshall to William Paterson (Apr. 19, 1802), in 6 THE PAPERS 
OF JOHN MARSHALL 108, 108-09 (Charles F. Hobson ed., 1990) [hereinafter 6 
MARSHALL PAPERS]. 
26 Letter from John Marshall to William Paterson (May 3, 1802), in 6 MARSHALL 
PAPERS, supra note 25, at 117, 117.  Only Justice Chase was inclined to refuse to ride 
circuit.  Letter from Samuel Chase to John Marshall (Apr. 24, 1802), in 6 MARSHALL 
PAPERS, supra note 25, at 109, 113-16. 
27 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803). 
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brief opinion, Justice Paterson, speaking for the Court, reaffirmed the 
decision the Justices had reached the preceding spring.28
This episode provided a revealing preview of Marshall’s collegial 
style of leadership of the Supreme Court.  In his communications with 
his fellow Justices, Marshall demonstrated an openness to argument 
and persuasion and a willingness to subordinate his own views if nec-
essary to obtain a single opinion of the Court—attributes that served 
him well during the next three decades.  The repeal crisis also 
brought forth Marshall’s essential moderation and his pragmatic rec-
ognition that “good policy” at times should supersede doctrinaire ad-
herence to strict law.  Marshall was instinctively cautious and acutely 
aware of the judiciary’s weakness and vulnerability.  His overriding 
concern during his first years as Chief Justice was to insure the judici-
ary’s survival by directing a prudent retreat away from “politics” and 
into the comfort zone of “law.”  Only in the safety of that refuge, Mar-
shall recognized early on, could the judiciary not simply hope to 
weather the immediate storm but also in the longer run to build up its 
institutional strength and elevate its status and authority. 
The separation of law and politics was also the broader issue in 
Marbury v. Madison,29 even though in the short run that case further 
implicated the Supreme Court in the partisan warfare of the day.  In 
announcing the Court’s opinion in February 1803, Chief Justice Mar-
shall affirmed that Marbury had a legal right to his commission but 
ultimately denied relief on the ground that the Court lacked jurisdic-
tion to issue a writ of mandamus to government officers.30  Although a 
provision of an act of Congress authorized such actions, the Chief Jus-
tice pronounced that provision unconstitutional as purporting to 
enlarge the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond that pre-
scribed by Article III of the Constitution.31
The refusal of the mandamus was thus a victory for the Jefferson 
administration, but at the time the opinion only exacerbated Republi-
can opposition to the judiciary.  Their anger was directed at the 
Court’s presumption in deciding the merits of the case, gratuitously 
charging the administration with acting unlawfully, before ultimately 
28 Id. at 309. 
29 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
30 Id. at 162, 175-76. 
31 Id. at 173-80; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (“In all Cases affecting Ambas-
sadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, 
the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.”). 
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denying jurisdiction to hear the case.32  They were not mollified by 
Marshall’s assurances that the Court’s province was solely to decide on 
issues of individual rights and not to inquire into executive conduct 
where the executive had discretion to act.  However, by denying juris-
diction, Marshall managed to uphold the claims of judicial power 
without having to issue an order commanding the executive to deliver 
the commission. 
By contrast, the Court’s assumption of authority to declare a law 
of Congress unconstitutional provoked scarcely a murmur at the time.  
Here again Marshall acted opportunely to assert the judiciary’s “duty” 
to regard the Constitution as law and to disallow legislative acts 
deemed to be repugnant to it.33  A broad spectrum of American opin-
ion in 1803 did not dispute this proposition, and Marshall appealed to 
this consensus in making the case for what came to be known as “judi-
cial review.”34  It helped enormously that Marbury was a case of judicial 
self-denial, of refusing jurisdiction that Congress had given, so that 
the Court could present itself as a high-minded, impartial tribunal 
concerned solely with expounding law.  Considered together, Marbury 
v. Madison and Stuart v. Laird amounted to a declaration of independ-
ence by the Supreme Court, an announcement of withdrawal from 
the political realm.  On the one hand, the Court refused to capitulate 
to the Republican administration’s contention that executive conduct 
was completely exempt from judicial oversight; on the other, in point-
edly refusing to reconsider the constitutionality of circuit riding by 
Supreme Court Justices, it resisted pressure to carry out Federalist 
Party goals. 
The horizon was not yet clear, however, as radical Republicans 
were bent on using impeachment as a means of removing federal 
judges.  A prime target was the irascible, overbearing Justice Chase, 
reviled for his partisan and intemperate conduct of sedition and trea-
son trials during the Adams administration and more recently for a 
grand jury charge denouncing the Jefferson administration and ex-
pressing contempt for democracy.  In March 1805, the Senate failed 
to convict Chase by the necessary two-thirds majority.  His acquittal 
signified a triumph of moderation within the Republican ranks that in 
time brought about a rapprochement between the political and judi-
32 1 WARREN, supra note 21, at 244-45, 248-53. 
33 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178. 
34 1 WARREN, supra note 21, at 255-68. 
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cial branches.35  By 1807, Jefferson had three of his own appointees—
William Johnson, Brockholst Livingston, and Thomas Todd—on the 
Supreme Court.  A clear indication of how far accommodation had 
progressed was the Madison administration’s response to a Supreme 
Court decision of 1809 ordering the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
to abide by a lower federal court decree.  When the Commonwealth 
resisted, President Madison reminded the Governor that the federal 
executive was legally bound to carry into effect any federal court de-
cree, “where opposition may be made to it.”36  From that time until 
the 1830s, accommodation—if not harmony—characterized interde-
partmental relations between the judiciary and the executive depart-
ment. 
B.  The Marshall Court, 1811-1824 
Following the deaths of Cushing and Chase, President Madison 
appointed Joseph Story and Gabriel Duvall in 1811 as Associate Jus-
tices.  Of the seven Justices on the Supreme Court (a seventh seat had 
been added in 1807), five had been appointed by Republican Presi-
dents.  But the Republican Justices were all political moderates, as 
were Marshall and Washington, the only Federalist holdovers.  Far 
from being a source of division, party affiliations were virtually mean-
ingless.  More important were forces binding them together:  their 
common heritage as members of the Revolutionary generation, their 
devotion to the Constitution and union, their shared values as mem-
bers of a common law legal culture, and their implicit belief that law 
and courts were vital to the functioning of government and society.37  
All were caught up in the surge of nationalism that rolled over the 
United States during and after the War of 1812.  Chief Justice Mar-
shall tapped into these unifying elements to consolidate the Court’s 
status and authority as guardian and interpreter of the Constitution.  
With no further changes in personnel taking place until 1823, the 
Marshall Court during the next dozen years achieved its highest de-
gree of internal unity and stability and made its most enduring contri-
butions to American constitutional law. 
35 RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS:  COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE 
YOUNG REPUBLIC 76-82, 96-107 (1971). 
36 GEORGE LEE HASKINS & HERBERT A. JOHNSON, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER:  JOHN 
MARSHALL, 1801-15, pt. 1, at 330 (The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, vol. 2, Paul A. Freund ed., 1981); see also id. at 
322-31 (discussing the incident). 
37 SMITH, supra note 2, at 402-04. 
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In this enterprise, no Chief Justice was more fortunate than Mar-
shall in having a colleague as talented, energetic, and devoted as Jo-
seph Story.  From the time he took his seat on the Court, Story de-
voted his fertile mind and boundless energy to the tasks of 
championing the jurisdiction of the federal courts, expansively read-
ing the powers conferred upon the general government, and vigor-
ously enforcing the Constitution’s protections of contractual and 
property rights.  In these judicial endeavors, he was the Chief Justice’s 
ablest and most effective associate.38  On their first meeting in 1808, 
Story took an instant liking to Marshall, impressed by his “great sub-
tilty of mind” and captivated by his “laugh,” which was “too hearty for 
an intriguer.”39  During more than two decades of service together on 
the Court, they formed an intimate friendship founded on mutual af-
fection and compatibility of beliefs and principles—most notably in 
their common devotion to nationalism.  The alliance between the Vir-
ginian and the New Englander was key to the effectiveness of the Mar-
shall Court.  “Without your vigorous and powerful cooperation,” the 
Chief wrote his younger associate in 1831, “I should be in despair, and 
think the ‘ship must be given up.’”40
Story was one of two Associate Justices who achieved a reputation 
in his own right while serving on the Marshall Court.  The other was 
William Johnson of South Carolina, who prided himself on being an 
independent jurist who spoke his own mind, as reflected in numerous 
concurring and dissenting opinions given over a period of thirty years 
(he has been called the Supreme Court’s “first dissenter”).41  Ap-
pointed by Jefferson, Johnson in fact was so independent as to be un-
predictable.  Contrary to Jefferson’s expectations, for example, the 
South Carolinian advocated implied powers and supported an ample 
reading of Congress’s power over commerce.  His doctrinal disagree-
ments with the Marshall Court consensus arose from his greater faith 
in legislative government, both state and federal, and a corresponding 
suspicion of expansive judicial power.  Temperamental, quick to take 
offense, and disinclined to ingratiate himself with his associates, John-
son had something of an “outsider” personality.  He posed no threat 
38 See generally NEWMYER, supra note 2, at 74-114. 
39 Letter from Joseph Story to Samuel P.P. Fay, supra note 9, at 167. 
40 Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (Nov. 10, 1831), in 12 MARSHALL 
PAPERS, supra note 15, at 124, 124. 
41 See generally DONALD G. MORGAN, JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON:  THE FIRST 
DISSENTER:  THE CAREER AND CONSTITUTIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF A JEFFERSONIAN JUDGE 
(1954). 
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as one who could win adherents or form his own coalition on the 
Court.  Marshall, as with all his associates, treated Johnson with re-
spect and sensitivity.  A measure of the Chief Justice’s skill in bringing 
this eccentric brother on board as a team player, if only temporarily, 
was Johnson’s silent approval of the nationalizing opinions handed 
down by the Marshall Court during these years.42
In a series of unanimous or near-unanimous decisions, the Su-
preme Court affirmed Congress’s implied powers, broadly interpreted 
Congress’s power to regulate commerce, struck down state laws that 
conflicted with the principle of federal supremacy or that violated the 
Constitution’s prohibition against laws impairing the obligation of 
contract, asserted broad jurisdiction to decide cases arising under the 
Constitution and laws of the United States, and sustained its appellate 
power over the state judiciaries.  Most of these cases originated in the 
state courts and came to the Supreme Court by writ of error, as pro-
vided by section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.43  Section 25 empow-
ered the Court to hear appeals from a state’s highest court in cases 
that involved a “federal” question—that is, when a state court denied a 
party’s right claimed under the Federal Constitution or a federal law 
or treaty.44
In the 1816 case of Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,45 the first important 
constitutional case after the War of 1812, Story established his creden-
tials as a judicial nationalist, filling in for the Chief Justice, who had 
disqualified himself from the case.  Story’s opinion made the defini-
tive case for the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over the state 
courts under section 25 of the Judiciary Act.46  In 1819, three major 
decisions invalidating state laws provided a stunning display of consti-
tutional nationalism.  In Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, the 
Court held that the colonial charter incorporating Dartmouth College 
was a contract protected by the Constitution and struck down New 
Hampshire’s laws converting the New England college into a state-
controlled university.47  The Court also applied the Contract Clause to 
42 Donald G. Morgan, The Origin of Supreme Court Dissent, 10 WM. & MARY Q. 353, 
367-68 (1953); see also HERBERT A. JOHNSON, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF JOHN 
MARSHALL, 1801-1835, at 32-33 (1997); R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE 
HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME COURT 404 (2001). 
43 Ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-87. 
44 Id. 
45 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
46 Id. at 327-51. 
47 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 651-54 (1819). 
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strike down a New York insolvency law in Sturges v. Crowninshield.48  
Marshall spoke for the Court in these two cases and in the third of 
that Term, McCulloch v. Maryland, proclaiming the doctrine of implied 
powers to uphold Congress’s power to incorporate a national bank 
and invoking the Supremacy Clause to deny a state’s right to tax the 
bank.49
Two years later, in Cohens v. Virginia, Chief Justice Marshall expan-
sively read the judiciary article as conferring on the Supreme Court 
broad jurisdiction to decide cases involving the conflicting powers of 
the federal and state governments.50 Green v. Biddle, first decided in 
1821 and reaffirmed in 1823, invalidated Kentucky’s land laws allow-
ing compensation to settlers who had been ousted by nonresident ti-
tleholders.51  Story wrote, for the Court, that the compact by which 
Kentucky had separated from Virginia was a contract protected 
against impairment by state legislation.52  The high tide of constitu-
tional nationalism continued through the 1824 Term, with Gibbons v. 
Ogden53 and Osborn v. Bank of the United States.54  In the former, Mar-
shall expounded the Commerce Clause for the first time in voiding 
New York’s laws establishing a monopoly on steam navigation of the 
state’s waterways.55  In the latter, the Chief Justice nullified Ohio’s at-
tempt to tax the national bank while affirming the federal judiciary’s 
broad jurisdiction to provide front-line protection to federal instru-
mentalities.56
Such judicial activism on behalf of nationalism aroused the forces 
of antifederalism and states’ rights, generating a torrent of impas-
sioned denunciations of the Supreme Court and its Chief Justice.  By 
then, however, the federal judiciary was much less isolated and vul-
nerable than it had been during the crisis years of 1801 to 1805.  Al-
though posing a continual challenge to the exercise of judicial power, 
states’ rights opposition to the Court was sporadic and local, never 
gaining ascendancy in the country at large.  A state or region that felt 
particularly aggrieved by a Supreme Court decision found little sup-
48 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819). 
49 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406-37 (1819). 
50 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 398-400 (1821). 
51 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823). 
52 Id. at 15-17. 
53 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
54 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
55 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 221. 
56 Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 867-68. 
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port elsewhere.  Nonetheless, a number of proposals were introduced 
in Congress to curb the Court’s powers such as repealing section 25, 
amending the Constitution to give appellate jurisdiction to the Senate 
when a state was a party, and enlarging the number of Justices on the 
Court to ten and requiring the concurrence of seven to pass on the 
constitutionality of state and federal acts.57  That none of these meas-
ures succeeded testified both to the American people’s underlying 
agreement to preserve the integrity of the Supreme Court and to 
Chief Justice Marshall’s leadership in transforming it into a tribunal of 
high prestige and authority. 
C.  The Marshall Court, 1825-1835 
Until the mid-1820s, all of the important cases that required the 
Supreme Court to perform the delicate task of determining the limits 
on state powers had resulted in an abridgment of state sovereignty.  
Mindful that these decisions had stirred up opposition to its assumed 
role as arbiter of the federal system, the Marshall Court during its last 
decade shifted into a lower gear, away from the high nationalism of its 
golden years, to a more accommodating posture with respect to the 
states.  In large measure this was a concession to changed circum-
stances, to a new political reality in the nation at large and on the 
Court itself.  For his part, Chief Justice Marshall proved sufficiently 
flexible to embrace political expediency so far as necessary to main-
tain the Court’s vitality and effectiveness. 
The internal unity of the Court began to erode during these years, 
as reflected by the increase in separate and dissenting opinions.  In 
truth, the so-called Marshall Court “monolith” had always been more 
of a façade held together by the Chief’s expert hand.58  On a Court 
that was changing with the addition of new members, Marshall was 
unable to maintain his former influence and control.  With 
Livingston’s death in 1823, Smith Thompson joined the Court during 
the 1824 Term.  Todd died in 1826, replaced by Robert Trimble, who 
served only one Term before he died in 1828.  Washington died the 
next year, leaving two vacancies.  President Andrew Jackson filled 
these with John McLean and Henry Baldwin, both of whom took their 
seats at the 1830 Term.59
57 1 WARREN, supra note 21, at 652-85. 
58 Morgan, supra note 42; Donald M. Roper, Judicial Unanimity and the Marshall 
Court—A Road to Reappraisal, 9 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1965). 
59 Morgan, supra note 42, at 375 n.81. 
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Earlier, in 1824, Johnson emerged from his temporary silence to 
announce that he would henceforth give his own opinion in major 
constitutional cases.60  Thompson and Trimble also served notice that 
they would follow an independent course.  With Johnson and Wash-
ington, they were part of a majority of four that, in the 1827 case of 
Ogden v. Saunders, upheld the validity of state bankruptcy laws that op-
erated prospectively on contracts.61  For the first and only time in his 
tenure, Chief Justice Marshall was compelled to dissent in a constitu-
tional case.62
The Court continued to issue decisions nullifying state laws, but its 
strong nationalist voice was now muffled by dissents.63  In the 1830 
case of Craig v. Missouri, for example, Marshall could muster only a 
bare majority to rule that state loan office certificates were “bills of 
credit” prohibited by the Constitution.64  Johnson, Thompson, and 
McLean wrote separate dissents in that case, leaving Marshall to fret 
about the future prospects of maintaining supervision over state 
courts under section 25 jurisdiction.65  What the Chief Justice called a 
“revolutionary spirit” also manifested itself in the rupture of the Jus-
tices’ communal living arrangements, which for so many years had 
served to promote harmony as well as efficiency.66
Ironically, whatever unity the Court now displayed occurred in 
cases upholding state laws.  In the 1829 case of Willson v. Black Bird 
Creek Marsh Co., a unanimous Court declared that a state law authoriz-
ing construction of a dam across a navigable creek was a legitimate 
exercise of regulatory power that did not interfere with Congress’s 
“dormant” power to regulate commerce.67  The Court also unani-
mously agreed, in 1830 in Providence Bank v. Billings, that a state law 
imposing a tax on corporations was not repugnant to the Contract 
60 Id. at 373.  Johnson made this announcement in his concurring opinion in Gib-
bons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 222-23. 
61 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 313, 331 (1827). 
62 Id. at 332 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting). 
63 See, e.g., Weston v. Charleston, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449 (1829) (holding unconstitu-
tional a municipal tax on stock issued for loans to the United States, with Justice John-
son dissenting); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827) (striking down a 
state law that required the licensing of importers of foreign articles, with Justice 
Thompson dissenting). 
64 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 410, 433 (1830). 
65 Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (Oct. 15, 1830), in 11 MARSHALL 
PAPERS, supra note 17, at 384, 384. 
66 Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (May 3, 1831), in 12 MARSHALL 
PAPERS, supra note 15, at 62, 62-63. 
67 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829). 
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Clause.68  Finally, in the 1833 case of Barron v. Baltimore,69 the Marshall 
Court’s last constitutional case, the Justices were of one mind in re-
jecting a Baltimore wharf owner’s attempt to invoke the “takings” 
clause of the Fifth Amendment to obtain compensation for damage to 
his property.  The Bill of Rights, said Marshall, was intended to restrict 
the federal government, not the state governments.70  As spokesman 
for these unanimous concessions to state sovereignty, Chief Justice 
Marshall showed himself to be a pragmatic jurist who valued unity 
above doctrinal purity. 
Despite this shifting tide, Marshall still had the clout to rally his 
brethren for an emphatically nationalist opinion in the 1832 case of 
Worcester v. Georgia, holding that Georgia’s laws extending sovereignty 
over the Cherokee Indians were repugnant to the Federal Constitu-
tion, laws, and treaties governing Indian affairs.71  In championing the 
rights of the Cherokee, however, the Supreme Court encountered re-
sistance to its authority not only from a single state but also from the 
Jackson administration, which supported Georgia’s sovereign preten-
sions.  Once again, as in its early years, the Marshall Court confronted 
a hostile President with a popular mandate.  However, the threatened 
clash between the Court and President Jackson over the enforcement 
of Worcester never materialized, as the administration successfully ne-
gotiated a compromise that resolved the case without further legal 
proceedings—a compromise in which the Cherokee were the losers.72
The last major decision of the Marshall Court, Worcester under-
scored the judiciary’s impotence in the face of a determined political 
majority.  The Court could not reverse the administration’s Indian 
policy and could not do anything for the Cherokee beyond affirming 
the tribe’s legal and constitutional rights.  Although demonstrating 
that the judiciary was indeed the “weakest branch,” the case in a real 
sense also heralded the Supreme Court’s maturation as an independ-
ent institution of the federal government.  Contrary to popular myth, 
the Jackson administration was not spoiling for a fight with the Mar-
shall Court.  The President did not defy its order, nor did he wish to 
be placed in a situation that would compel him to choose between 
68 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514, 564-65 (1830). 
69 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
70 Id. at 250-51. 
71 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 562-63 (1832). 
72 Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases:  A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 
STAN. L. REV. 500, 520-31 (1969); Edwin A. Miles, After John Marshall’s Decision:  Worces-
ter v. Georgia and the Nullification Crisis, 39 J. S. HIST. 519 (1973). 
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compliance or defiance.73  For their part, Marshall and his brethren 
had no desire to issue an order to the executive.  Yet they incurred the 
risk of confrontation in order to avoid a greater risk—loss of institu-
tional pride and identity.  To have remained silent in the face of a 
manifest violation of the Constitution and federal laws would have se-
riously compromised the Supreme Court’s claim to be the guardian 
and expositor of the nation’s fundamental law, if not the keeper of 
the nation’s moral conscience.  As Story remarked, the Justices could 
“wash their hands clean of the iniquity of oppressing the Indians, and 
disregarding their rights.”74
Soon after the Chief Justice’s death in 1835, John Quincy Adams 
recorded a tribute that, coming from a former President and percep-
tive observer of the national scene, spoke volumes for how far the Su-
preme Court and the office of Chief Justice had risen in importance 
during the preceding three decades.  Marshall, wrote Adams, 
was one of the most eminent men that this country has ever pro-
duced. . . . All constitutional governments are flexible things; and as the 
Supreme Judicial Court is the tribunal of last resort for the construction 
of the Constitution and the laws, the office of Chief Justice of that Court 
is a station of the highest trust, of the deepest responsibility, and of in-
fluence far more extensive than that of the President of the United 
States. . . . Marshall, by the ascendency of his genius, by the amenity of 
his deportment, and by the imperturbable command of his temper, has 
given a permanent and systematic character to the decisions of the 
Court, and settled many great constitutional questions favorably to the 
continuance of the Union.75
III.  MARSHALL AS CHIEF JUSTICE 
John Marshall defined the office of Chief Justice in various ways.  
His primary responsibility was to preside over the Supreme Court’s 
annual meeting in Washington.  From the outset, he sought to make 
the Court both a collegial and an efficient institution by bringing the 
Justices together under the same roof.  Instead of going their separate 
ways after court adjourned each day, the Justices reconvened at their 
boardinghouse to consult about cases.  The boardinghouse confer-
73 See generally Miles, supra note 72. 
74 Letter from Joseph Story to Sarah W. Story (Mar. 4, 1832), in 2 LIFE AND 
LETTERS, supra note 9, at 86, 87. 
75 9 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS:  COMPRISING PORTIONS OF HIS DIARY FROM 
1795 TO 1848, at 243 (AMS Press 1970) (1876). 
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ence was Marshall’s best opportunity to exercise leadership, notably in 
persuading his brethren to sign on to a single opinion of the Court. 
Marshall’s responsibility as Chief Justice was not confined to the 
Supreme Court.  Marshall Court Justices probably spent more judicial 
time attending their circuit courts than they did in Washington.  Be-
cause many federal cases began and ended on circuit, Marshall be-
lieved it was important that such cases be decided according to uni-
form principles.  To promote this goal on his own circuit, the Chief 
Justice, when beset by doubts, regularly wrote to his brethren for ad-
vice. 
Marshall’s tenure as Chief Justice commenced at a time of turmoil 
and crisis for the federal judiciary.  Although it survived the early con-
frontation with the Jefferson administration, the Marshall Court was 
subject to periodic attacks in subsequent years.  No one felt the sting 
of censure more acutely than Marshall, who willingly assumed the role 
as the judiciary’s chief advocate and defender. 
A.  Presiding over Court and Conference 
For most of Marshall’s tenure, the Supreme Court sat in a base-
ment room of the Capitol below the Senate chamber.  The annual 
Term commenced the first Monday in February (moved to the second 
Monday in January, beginning in 1827) and continued into the mid-
dle of March.  Adjournment could not be postponed indefinitely be-
cause the Justices had to return home in time to hold their spring cir-
cuits.  The Court met daily (except Sunday) from eleven to four, 
hearing arguments that often went on for hours76 and could extend 
over several days.77  A rule of court limited the number of lawyers to 
no more than two for each party.78  This rule was suspended, however, 
in the great bank case of McCulloch v. Maryland,79 which employed the 
talents of six distinguished counselors in an argument that extended 
over nine days.80  
In sharp contrast to modern Court practice, which restricts oral 
argument to thirty minutes, during which counsel is frequently inter-
rupted by questions from the bench, in Marshall’s day the lawyers 
were “heard in silence for hours, without being stopped or inter-
76 1 WARREN, supra note 21, at 467. 
77 SMITH, supra note 2, at 292. 
78 SUP. CT. R. 23, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) ix (1828). 
79 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
80 1 WARREN, supra note 21, at 507. 
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rupted.”81  At his first Term in 1812, Story noted that the arguments 
were “excessively prolix and tedious; but generally the subject is ex-
hausted, and it is not very difficult to perceive at the close of the 
cause, in many cases, where the press of the argument and of the law 
lies.”82  The Court heard the lawyers out because they depended on 
oral arguments for the explication of the issues and authorities on 
which the case turned.  Unlike current practice, counsel did not file 
comprehensive written briefs in advance of oral argument.  Prior to 
hearing a case, the Justices had only the appellate record, consisting 
of a transcript of the proceedings in the court below and an abstract 
of the pleadings, facts, documents, and points of law and fact to be 
presented.  Such statements were often no more than a page or two 
and did not amount to a coherent legal argument.83  Oral argument, 
then, was essential to understanding all aspects of a case.  While the 
lawyers argued, the Justices took notes in a memorandum book or, as 
Marshall did, on the flyleaves of the printed record.  At the end of the 
Term, Marshall delivered his accumulated notes to the reporter to use 
in preparing his report of the arguments.84
According to contemporary descriptions, Chief Justice Marshall 
presided with wisdom, dignity, and impartiality—virtues of the ideal 
judge—which were accompanied by a self-effacing modesty, benign 
temper, and kindly manner.  He was noted for being “exceedingly 
kind and courteous to the Bar,” listening to their arguments “with the 
greatest attention.”85  Story drew the fullest portrait of Marshall in 
court: 
Enter but that hall, and you saw him listening with a quiet, easy dignity 
to the discussions at the bar; silent, serious, searching; with a keenness of 
thought, which sophistry could not mislead, or error confuse, or ingenu-
ity delude; with a benignity of aspect, which invited the modest to move 
on with confidence; with a conscious firmness of purpose, which re-
pressed arrogance, and overawed declamation.  You heard him pro-
nounce the opinion of the Court in a low but modulated voice, unfold-
ing in luminous order every topic of argument, trying its strength, and 
81 Id. at 467. 
82 Letter from Joseph Story to Samuel P.P. Fay, Esq. (Feb. 24, 1812), in 1 LIFE AND 
LETTERS, supra note 9, at 215, 215. 
83 R. Kirkland Cozine, The Emergence of Written Appellate Briefs in the Nineteenth-
Century United States, 38 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 482, 486-87 (1994). 
84 Letter from John Marshall to William Wirt ( July 6, 1825), in 10 MARSHALL 
PAPERS, supra note 14, at 193. 
85 1 WARREN, supra note 21, at 469. 
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measuring its value, until you felt yourself in the presence of the very 
oracle of the law.
86
In the conference room, Marshall brought “the same presiding 
genius, the same kindness, attentiveness, and deference; and yet, 
when the occasion required, the same power of illustration, the same 
minuteness of research, the same severity of logic, and the same untir-
ing accuracy in facts and principles.”87  Here, too, the Chief Justice was 
a patient and attentive listener, not merely soliciting but demanding 
arguments—“no judge ever profited more by them,” Story remarked.88  
By careful and alert listening, he quickly and almost intuitively 
grasped a case’s leading principles and the points on which it turned 
without having a previous acquaintance with “the learning upon 
which it depended.”89
The conference took place in the boardinghouse, to which the 
Justices returned after court adjourned at four.  As Marshall com-
mented in an 1831 letter, except for attending occasional social 
events, he spent his evenings “in consultation with the Judges.”90  
Upon joining the Court in 1812, Story immediately felt the harmoniz-
ing and unifying effects of living with his brethren “in the most frank 
and unaffected intimacy” and being “all united as one, with a mutual 
esteem which makes even the labors of Jurisprudence light.”91  As led 
by Marshall, the boardinghouse conference was remarkably well 
adapted to reaching a decision promptly, often, said Story, “in a few 
hours.”92  Living and dining together encouraged a frank yet cordial 
exchange of views, fostered collegiality, and advanced the goal of 
reaching an opinion of the Court.  The Chief was a master at conduct-
ing serious business in an atmosphere of conviviality, even mirth.  The 
usually ascetic Justices were known on occasion to stretch their rule of 
drinking wine only in wet weather.  Marshall would sometimes ask 
“Brother Story” to “step to the window and see if it does not look like 
rain.”  And if Story informed him that the sun was “shining brightly,” 
the Chief Justice might reply, “[a]ll the better; for our jurisdiction ex-
86 Story, supra note 10, at 692. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 694. 
89 Id. 
90 Letter from John Marshall to Mary W. Marshall ( Jan. 30, 1831), in 12 MARSHALL 
PAPERS, supra note 15, at 15, 16. 
91 Letter from Joseph Story to Samuel P.P. Fay, supra note 82, at 215. 
92 Id. at 215-16. 
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tends over so large a territory that the doctrine of chances makes it 
certain that it must be raining somewhere.”93
Probably at Marshall’s direction, if not by his example, the Justices 
usually came alone to Washington, living pretty much in monastic se-
clusion from Washington society.  This was perhaps yet another way in 
which Marshall tried to project an image of an independent judiciary 
composed of serious and sober-minded judges devoted to doing the 
public’s work.  They did, to be sure, attend dinners and other social 
events, but Court business took priority.  At one busy Term, the con-
ference met every day except Sunday.  Marshall declined an invitation 
for a Wednesday, explaining that he could not be absent “from our 
daily consultation without inter[r]upting the course of the business & 
arresting its progress.”94  No one understood better than the Chief Jus-
tice the importance of communal living for the efficient conduct of 
business.  Only by adhering to a strict regimen could the Justices hope 
to get through a docket that became increasingly crowded during and 
after the War of 1812.  Toward the end of his tenure, Marshall en-
countered difficulty keeping the Justices together, a sign of his dimin-
ishing ability to preserve the Court’s internal unity.  He worried that if 
the Justices scattered, the consequence would be many undecided 
cases and “seriatim opinions.”95
B.  The Opinion of the Court 
The single majority opinion had been the Marshall Court’s most 
distinctive practice from the outset, as announced in the 1801 case of 
Talbot v. Seeman.96  In adopting the single opinion, Marshall deliber-
ately departed from the traditional mode of seriatim opinions by each 
of the Justices, which had prevailed under his predecessors and was 
also the custom in both the state and English courts.97  As precedents 
93 JOSIAH QUINCY, FIGURES OF THE PAST FROM THE LEAVES OF OLD JOURNALS 189-
90 (4th ed. 1883). 
94 Letter from John Marshall to John Randolph (Mar. 4, 1816), in 8 THE PAPERS 
OF JOHN MARSHALL 127, 127 (Charles F. Hobson ed., 1995) [hereinafter 8 MARSHALL 
PAPERS]. 
95 Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (May 3, 1831), in 12 MARSHALL 
PAPERS, supra note 15, at 62, 62-63. 
96 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801); see also SMITH, supra note 2, at 292-93 (discussing 
the origins of the “Opinion of the Court” practice in the Talbot case). 
97 Under Chief Justice Ellsworth, “By the Court” opinions began to be issued with-
out accompanying opinions by individual Justices.  G. Edward White, The Internal Pow-
ers of the Chief Justice:  The Nineteenth-Century Legacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1463, 1470 
(2006). 
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for the single opinion practice, Marshall could point to Lord Mans-
field, Chief Judge of England’s Court of Kings Bench in the late 
eighteenth century, and to Judge Edmund Pendleton of the Virginia 
Court of Appeals, before whom the future Chief Justice had argued 
cases in the 1780s and 1790s.  Marshall recognized the advantages of a 
single statement in imparting weight and authority to the Court’s 
pronouncements, thereby promoting certainty and stability in the law.  
The public would come to perceive the Court as a unified and inde-
pendent institution whose judgments were formed by solemn collec-
tive deliberation.98  The Court would enhance its authority and pres-
tige while the Chief Justice as its spokesman would become the 
personal embodiment of its stature and dignity.99
A telling measure of how quickly and thoroughly Marshall institu-
tionalized the single opinion is that between 1801 and 1804 he deliv-
ered the opinion for all the cases in which he sat.100  Through the 
1807 Term, he spoke for the Court in nearly three-fourths of the re-
ported cases.101  During its first decade, the Marshall Court evidently 
adopted a seniority rule, by which the Chief Justice was the most sen-
ior of the Justices by virtue of his commission.102  In later years, the 
Court appears to have abandoned the seniority rule, and the delivery 
of the majority opinion was distributed among other Justices.  Still, the 
general pattern of Marshall speaking for the Court persisted through-
out his tenure.  During his last eight terms, he gave the opinion in 
more than forty percent of the cases.  In thirty-five years, he delivered 
more than 500 of the Court’s estimated 1106 reported opinions103 and 
more than sixty percent of the constitutional opinions.104
During his first decade as Chief Justice, Marshall’s quest for inter-
nal unity was made easier by having Associate Justices of his Federalist 
political persuasion.  The “siege” mentality brought on by the judici-
ary crisis also served to bind the Justices more closely together, pro-
mote cohesiveness, and induce them to speak with one voice through 
the Chief.  Some of his colleagues may have been more compliant be-
cause age and infirmity had eroded their physical and intellectual 
98 SMITH, supra note 2, at 292-93. 
99 NEWMYER, supra note 42, at 157. 
100 Morgan, supra note 42, at 355. 
101 6 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 25, at 70. 
102 JOHNSON, supra note 42, at 100-01. 
103 Morgan, supra note 42, at 363 n.32. 
104 Robert G. Seddig, John Marshall and the Origins of Supreme Court Leadership, 36 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 785, 800 tbl.1 (1975). 
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vigor.  This was particularly true of Cushing and Paterson, whose best 
days were behind them.105  Along with advancing years, Chase’s im-
peachment ordeal106 appears to have chastened him into silence.  Wil-
liam Johnson, Jefferson’s first appointee, joined the Court in 1804.  In 
a later recollection, he explained the “real cause” of Marshall’s domi-
nance:  “Cushing was incompetent, Chase could not be got to think or 
write—Patterson was a slow man and willingly declined the trouble, 
and the other two judges [Marshall and Washington] you know are 
commonly estimated as one judge.”107  Even discounting Johnson’s 
recollection as overstated, it is fair to say that Marshall was able to take 
charge so quickly and thoroughly because his associates were disin-
clined to put up any resistance. 
Once firmly established, the single majority opinion survived for 
the duration of the Marshall Court.  It had the effect of projecting 
unity when in fact the judges were divided.  Unless the opinion was 
said to be “unanimous,” the size of the majority was unknown.  The 
internal dynamics of this collegial institution encouraged silent acqui-
escence by Justices who dissented from the majority.  Johnson, who 
had been accustomed to seriatim opinions as a state court judge, was 
dissuaded early on from delivering a dissent by “lectures on the inde-
cency of judges cutting at each other.”108  He accordingly “bent to the 
current” but “persevered,” he wrote in 1822, until the Justices adopted 
their present policy of appointing “someone to deliver the opinion of 
the majority,” leaving “it to the discretion of the rest of the Judges to 
record their opinions or not ad libitum.”109  On one occasion, Story 
suppressed a strong urge to dissent, noting that “Judge Washington 
thinks (and very correctly) that the habit of delivering dissenting 
opinions on ordinary occasions weakens the authority of the Court, 
and is of no public benefit.”110  Dissenting opinions did occur, to be 
sure, though usually prefaced with an apology from the Justice for dis-
agreeing with his colleagues.  Most of the Marshall Court Justices, in-
cluding the Chief Justice, dissented at one time or another, with John-
son recording the greatest number of dissents. 
105 JOHNSON, supra note 42, at 100. 
106 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
107 Letter from William Johnson to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 10, 1822), quoted in 
Morgan, supra note 42, at 369. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Letter from Joseph Story to Henry Wheaton (Apr. 8, 1818), in 1 LIFE AND 
LETTERS, supra note 9, at 303-04. 
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Although most of the original drafts of Supreme Court opinions 
for the Marshall years have been lost, the surviving material indicates 
that Marshall wrote, as well as delivered, the opinions in which he 
spoke for the Court.  Over time, with the steady increase in the num-
ber of cases on the docket, the labor of composing the opinion of the 
Court had to be more widely shared with the other Justices.  Up to the 
end, however, his output was prodigious.  In 1834, he delivered thirty-
two opinions (about half the total), the largest number given at any 
Term during his tenure.111  The manuscripts of twenty of these opin-
ions are in his hand; the others are short opinions that were not 
committed to writing.112
Of all the assets that made Marshall a great leader of the Court, 
perhaps none was as important as his fluency with a pen.  He simply 
had no peer in turning out cogently argued and lucidly written opin-
ions in a timely fashion.  In sessions whose duration for most of Mar-
shall’s tenure were about a month and a half, the Court had to act ex-
peditiously to produce a decision and opinion in all the cases that 
were argued.  In no small part because of the Chief Justice’s facility in 
writing, the Marshall Court compiled a remarkable record in meeting 
this goal at every Term.  In the great majority of cases, the decision 
was announced and the opinion given within a week of the close of 
argument.113  The interval was understandably longer for the major 
constitutional cases, but with the exception of Dartmouth College,114 
Marshall managed to write and deliver the constitutional opinions 
during the Term they were argued.  McCulloch,115 regarded by many as 
Marshall’s greatest opinion, was delivered a scant three days after the 
close of argument.116  The short interval between argument and opin-
ion raises questions that cannot be answered with certainty.  For ex-
ample, in McCulloch, did the Justices moot this case in conference and 
take a preliminary vote while it was still being argued?  Did the Chief 
Justice, once the case’s disposition was clear, begin drafting the opin-
111 12 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 15, at 558-60. 
112 See id. (listing Marshall’s opinions for the 1834 Term and indicating those for 
which a manuscript exists). 
113 Lists of Marshall’s Supreme Court opinions, along with the dates of argument 
and decision, can be found in the appendices of volumes six through twelve of The Pa-
pers of John Marshall. 
114 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
115 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
116 See 8 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 94, at 396, for dates of arguments and deci-
sions in Dartmouth College and McCulloch. 
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ion before the argument had concluded?117  The text of the opinion 
Marshall pronounced in open court was virtually the same as that pub-
lished a few months later in the official report.  This can be confirmed 
by comparing the report with the newspaper version published a few 
days after the opinion was handed down.118
How close a vetting did Marshall’s draft get from his associates?  In 
1819, a newspaper critic of McCulloch insinuated that, in the absence 
of seriatim opinions, the public could not know whether the other 
Justices approved of the Chief Justice’s reasoning.  This provoked an 
indignant reply from Marshall, who under cover of a pseudonym 
pointed out that 
the chief justice never speaks in the singular number, or in his own per-
son, but as the mere organ of the court. . . . The course of every tribunal 
must necessarily be, that the opinion which is to be delivered as the 
opinion of the court, is previously submitted to the consideration of all 
the judges; and, if any part of the reasoning be disapproved, it must be 
so modified as to receive the approbation of all, before it can be deliv-
ered as the opinion of all.
119
This evidently did not mean that the Chief Justice circulated his 
draft among the Justices for their comments, which he then incorpo-
rated in a revised draft.  It did mean that, at a minimum, the opinion 
was read to the assembled Justices in conference.120  If a Justice raised 
objections or suggested changes, he most likely aired them at the con-
ference reading.  No doubt the Justices gave close scrutiny to constitu-
tional opinions.  But, given the constraints of time, in ordinary cases 
they were not likely to delay matters by insisting on extensive revisions. 
If the drafting of the opinion was the responsibility of a single Jus-
tice, most often Chief Justice Marshall, must we conclude that this was 
essentially an individual activity, that the opinion’s content “was a mat-
ter only for himself and the Court’s reporter”?121  If the single majority 
opinion conveyed a misleading impression of unity, it also had the ef-
117 White suggests affirmative answers to both of these questions.  White, supra 
note 97, at 1472-73. 
118 See John Marshall, Opinion, DAILY NAT’L INTELLIGENTER (Wash., D.C.), Mar. 13, 
1819, reprinted in 8 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 94, at 259 (providing Marshall’s opin-
ion in McCulloch). 
119 A Friend to the Union No. I, U.S. GAZETTE & TRUE AMERICAN (Phila.), Apr. 24, 
1819, reprinted in 8 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 94, at 287, 290. 
120 See Letter from John Marshall to John M. Patton (Mar. 2, 1831), in 12 
MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 15, at 39 (stating that he had not attended the confer-
ence and did not “hear the opinion read except in court”). 
121 White, supra note 97, at 1473. 
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fect of magnifying the Chief Justice’s role while diminishing that of his 
associates.  It concealed the degree to which the opinion was the 
product of collective deliberation, of compromise and accommoda-
tion.  Because this process took place orally, undocumented by any 
surviving conference memoranda or notes, it has largely been lost to 
history.  Although the boardinghouse conference proceedings cannot 
be recovered, we can reasonably speculate that Marshall acted some-
what like a committee chair who collected the views of his associates 
and fashioned a report that reflected the sense of the whole.  To assist 
him, he had the record of the case, the lawyers’ abstracts, his notes of 
the argument, and perhaps notes or memoranda of the conference.  
If Marshall himself did not take notes during the conference, then 
Story was a likely candidate to act as recording secretary.  Suffice to say 
there was nothing comparable to the opinion writing process of the 
modern Court, with its multiple drafts and exchange of memoranda. 
At the time of delivery, there was only an original rough draft of 
the opinion.  In response to a newspaper publisher’s request to pub-
lish Cohens,122 Marshall explained that the opinion was “the property 
of the court” and that he would have to ask his colleagues if they 
would “part with the original; having no copy.”123  To a similar request 
in 1824 for a copy of the opinion in Gibbons,124 Marshall again noted 
that there was no copy and added that 
the rough draft has, as will always happen when an opinion on an exten-
sive & complex question is written without previous arrangement, fre-
quent insertions of argument which are supposed to belong properly to 
a part which has been passed, in separate papers with letters of refer-
ence.  Without great care this will lead to blunders in printing of a seri-
ous extent.  Mr. Wheaton is accustomed to copying our opinions & will 
be enabled to be of great service to you should you proceed to print it.
125
In this rough form, with its insertions and deletions, the draft was 
turned over to the reporter, who then made a fair copy for the 
printer.  Once the opinion was set in type and proofed, the reporter 
must have, in many instances, destroyed the original or made no spe-
122 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). 
123 Letter from John Marshall to Gales & Seaton (Mar. 3, 1821), in 9 THE PAPERS 
OF JOHN MARSHALL 143, 143 (Charles F. Hobson ed., 1998) [hereinafter 9 MARSHALL 
PAPERS]. 
124 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
125 Letter from John Marshall to Gales & Seaton (Mar. 3, 1824), in 10 MARSHALL 
PAPERS, supra note 14, at 35. 
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cial effort to preserve it.126  The Chief Justice took an active interest in 
the publication of the opinion and in making sure that it was accu-
rately printed.  He knew from experience that a newspaper printing of 
the original manuscript was likely to contain errors.  After reading the 
newspaper rendition of Cohens, he drew up a list of typographical and 
other errors for Wheaton to correct before publishing his report, 
carefully noting the page, column, paragraph, and line where the er-
rors had occurred.127
Between the reading of the opinion and its publication in the re-
ports, there was an opportunity to make alterations.  Story, for exam-
ple, read over Marshall’s Dartmouth College opinion before publication 
and suggested deleting a passage concerning the exercise of judicial 
functions by legislatures.  Marshall readily consented to Story’s “edit-
ing” in a way that underscored his implicit trust in his junior brother’s 
judgment:  “I would myself prefer that it should stand as you suggest; 
but were it otherwise, your opinion in a case on which I felt no par-
ticular solicitude, would be decisive with me.”128  After seeing the opin-
ion in Cohens as published in the newspapers “attacked with a degree 
of virulence superior even to that which was employed in the Bank 
question,”129 Marshall instructed Wheaton to add a note to his report 
showing that the case had come properly before the Court under sec-
tion 25 of the Judiciary Act.130  In his original draft of Worcester,131 Mar-
shall omitted a sentence he intended as the conclusion to the argu-
ment.  Three weeks after delivering the opinion, he supplied the 
omission to the reporter, who incorporated it into the report.132
The only opportunity for Marshall and his brethren to write opin-
ions or prepare memoranda in advance of the Court’s conference was 
126 Not until 1834 were original opinions of the Supreme Court preserved as part 
of the official archival record.  6 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 25, at 70. 
127 Letter from John Marshall to Henry Wheaton (Mar. 24, 1821), in 9 MARSHALL 
PAPERS, supra note 123, at 147, 148. 
128 Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (Apr. 28, 1819), in 8 MARSHALL 
PAPERS, supra note 94, at 309, 309. 
129 Letter from John Marshall to Henry Wheaton (June 2, 1821), in 9 MARSHALL 
PAPERS, supra note 123, at 150, 150. 
130 Id.  Marshall claimed the critics had accused the Court of “‘feigning’ a case for 
the purpose [of] ushering prematurely on the public their political dogmas.”  Id. (al-
teration in original).  Wheaton received Marshall’s note in time for insertion into the 
official report.  See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 376 n.a (1821) (reflect-
ing the addition). 
131 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
132 See Letter from John Marshall to Richard Peters (Mar. 23, 1832), in 12 
MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 15, at 188, 189; see also Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 562. 
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in cases held under advisement from one Term to the next.  One con-
stitutional case, Dartmouth College,133 fell into this category.  The argu-
ment of that case concluded on March 12, 1818.  The next day Chief 
Justice Marshall ordered the case to be continued to the 1819 Term, 
noting that some Justices had not come to an opinion and those who 
had formed opinions did not agree.  The expectation was that the 
case would be reargued in 1819, but instead Marshall pronounced the 
Court’s opinion on February 2, the second day of the Term.134  Pre-
sumably, he drafted the opinion before he came to Washington and 
presented it to the Justices in conference on February 1. 
Under Marshall’s tight management of the docket, the Court did 
not have many cases under advisement.  Such cases elicited occasional 
comment in his correspondence, which is otherwise relatively sparse 
on Supreme Court matters.  The important militia case of Houston v. 
Moore135 in 1820, for example, was argued during the 1819 Term and 
held over.  In response to a letter from Story in the summer of 1819, 
Marshall said he “had never thought of preparing an opinion” in that 
case, adding:  “That is committed to you & cannot be in better hands.  
I shall just sketch my ideas for the purpose of examining them more 
closely but shall not prepare a regular opinion.”136  Writing to Story in 
1823 on another case under advisement, the Chief Justice noted that 
he had “come with very considerable doubt” to a different conclusion 
from Story’s and hoped he would prepare an opinion.137  “Should the 
court concur with you,” said Marshall, “I shall be far from regretting it 
for my opinion in this case is not one of those in which I feel such 
confidence as to regret its not prevailing.”138  Again, in 1829, Marshall 
asked Story to turn his attention “to the two great cases we have under 
advisement.”  One of these, the 1830 case of Inglis v. Trustees of the 
Sailor’s Snug Harbour,139 had come up from New York.  The Chief Jus-
tice was anxious that Story prepare an opinion because he himself 
would not be able to give it the attention it deserved.  He presumed 
Justice Thompson (of New York) would write an opinion, “but if the 
majority of the court should not concur with him, it will be necessary 
133 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
134 8 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 94, at 219-20. 
135 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820). 
136 Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (July 13, 1819), in 8 MARSHALL 
PAPERS, supra note 94, at 352, 353. 
137 Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (Nov. 24, 1823), in 9 MARSHALL 
PAPERS, supra note 123, at 346, 346. 
138 Id. (footnote omitted). 
139 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99 (1830). 
 
1450 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 154: 1421 
 
that preparation should be made for such an event.”140  These com-
ments provide further testimony that opinion writing on the Marshall 
Court was a cooperative enterprise. 
C.  Maintaining Uniformity on Circuit 
The Justices of the Marshall Court also sat as trial judges of the 
U.S. circuit courts, which they attended twice yearly—each spring and 
fall.  Chief Justice Marshall attended the Fifth Circuit, composed of 
Virginia and North Carolina, holding court in Richmond and Raleigh.  
When he discussed judicial matters in his correspondence, Marshall 
most often sought advice about new and difficult questions arising on 
circuit.  Most of these cases, in turn, were ones that he could not carry 
to the Supreme Court because they neither met the jurisdictional 
minimum of two thousand dollars nor were eligible for a certificate of 
division between the two judges constituting the circuit court.  In one 
such case, Marshall remarked that he would have carried it to the Su-
preme Court, but he did not have “the privilege of dividing the court 
when alone & as the sum is only about 1800$ it must abide by my deci-
sion.”141  The Chief Justice sought guidance not merely to decide the 
particular case but to promote the goals of consistency and uniformity 
in similar cases arising in the various circuits.  As he explained in a let-
ter soliciting advice on the perplexing questions raised in the 1807 
treason case of Aaron Burr, Marshall would have preferred a full con-
sultation with his brethren on points “on which a contrariety of opin-
ion ought not to prevail in the different circuits, but which cannot eas-
ily be carried before the supreme court.”142  Aware of a judge’s un-
willingness to “commit himself by an opinion on a case not before him 
& on which he has heard no argument,” the Chief Justice urged that 
this consideration be outweighed by the “strong & general repug-
140 Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (July 3, 1829), in 11 MARSHALL 
PAPERS, supra note 17, at 263, 263, 264 n.4. 
141 Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (July 13, 1819), in 8 MARSHALL 
PAPERS, supra note 94, at 352, 352.  In stating that he did not have “the privilege of di-
viding the court when alone,” Marshall meant that in the absence of U.S. District Judge 
St. George Tucker, he could not use the certificate of division as a means of sending 
the case up to the Supreme Court.  The certificate of division was provided by the Ju-
diciary Act of 1802.  When both judges of the circuit court were present, they could 
“agree to disagree” in difficult cases and refer them to the Supreme Court.  G. EDWARD 
WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 1815-1835, at 173-74 (1988). 
142 Letter from John Marshall to William Cushing ( June 29, 1807), in 7 THE 
PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 60, 60 (Charles F. Hobson ed., 1993) [hereinafter 7 
MARSHALL PAPERS]. 
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nance to giving contradictory decisions on the same points” on cir-
cuit.143
On many subsequent occasions Marshall was not shy about asking 
advice.  These letters provide ample confirmation of his modest and 
deferential style of leadership, his ready acceptance of his colleagues’ 
better-informed judgment, and his willingness to subordinate his views 
for the sake of uniformity.  They also illuminate his close professional 
and personal bond with Story, on whose advice he placed the greatest 
trust and confidence.  Story and Washington were the only Justices 
with whom Marshall regularly corresponded, but most of his letters to 
Washington concerned their joint projects to publish a revised edition 
of Marshall’s Life of George Washington and to prepare an edition of 
General Washington’s correspondence. 
The immensely learned Story could throw light on any legal sub-
ject but was of particular service in admiralty questions.  Not having 
practiced in admiralty courts and sitting on a circuit that had less ad-
miralty business than any other on the Atlantic, Marshall was admit-
tedly “not versed” in that area of law.144  After obtaining his younger 
colleague’s views on one such case, Marshall replied that he would de-
cide it “in conformity with your reasoning.  It is I think perfectly 
sound; & were this even questionable, the practice of the courts ought 
to be uniform.”145  In another case, involving a claim for salvage on a 
vessel recaptured from pirates, Marshall wondered if the question had 
been decided elsewhere.  If not, he wrote Story, “you will greatly 
oblige me by your sentiments on it, as I know that you are more au fait 
on these questions than I am.”146  On another occasion he confessed 
to having “so little experience in admiralty proceedings that I some-
times doubt in cases which are probably quite of common occurrence 
and are thought very plain by those who have much practice of that 
description.”147  The case in question was a libel in admiralty by one 
who had furnished supplies to a vessel not within the Court’s jurisdic-
tion.  Was “such a suit sustainable?” asked the Chief Justice.148  Mar-
143 Id. at 62. 
144 Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (May 27, 1819), in 8 MARSHALL 
PAPERS, supra note 94, at 313, 314. 
145 Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (July 13, 1819), in 8 MARSHALL 
PAPERS, supra note 94, at 352, 352 (footnote omitted). 
146 Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (Dec. 9, 1823), in 9 MARSHALL 
PAPERS, supra note 123, at 353, 354. 
147 Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (May 23, 1831), in 12 MARSHALL 
PAPERS, supra note 15, at 67, 67. 
148 Id. at 68. 
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shall subsequently adopted Story’s opinion sustaining the jurisdiction, 
“though in doing so I have reversed the decree of my brother 
Barbour.”149
In a piracy case heard on circuit in 1823, the defendant’s counsel 
moved to have a mixed jury of foreigners and citizens.  Such juries 
could be ordered under state law, but there was no federal law to this 
effect.  Marshall and U.S. District Judge St. George Tucker ultimately 
granted the motion, though the Chief Justice had doubts.  He ex-
plained to Story that Tucker “was very clear in favor of the applica-
tion,” and added that the bar had informed them of a New York cir-
cuit case in which Justice Thompson had directed a mixed jury: 
Being unwilling in a capital case to reject the application of the prisoner 
by a division of the court, where I felt doubt myself, & where an associate 
Justice had determined the question in favor of the application I con-
curred in directing the jury.  It is a point on which the practice ought 
certainly to be uniform & I propose to suggest it to the Judges in Febru-
ary next.
150
In the meantime, he wished Story to turn his mind to the subject.151
Marshall also appealed to his New England brother for aid in re-
solving puzzling commercial questions, such as one concerning the 
law of principal and agent in a suit between Virginia merchants and 
New York merchants.  The Chief Justice searched all his books on the 
subject but could “find nothing applicable to this case.”152  Marshall, 
who off the bench was a farmer, then added, “You commercial men 
are familiar with these questions—to us agriculturists they are at least 
novel.”153  Other legal queries on which the Chief Justice solicited in-
formation concerned the respective liabilities of the creditors of an 
insolvent public debtor,154 a demurrer to evidence in a case against a 
whiskey distiller,155 and the sufficiency of process served on the presi-
149 Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story ( June 26, 1831), in 12 MARSHALL 
PAPERS, supra note 15, at 93, 93. 
150 Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (Nov. 24, 1823), in 9 MARSHALL 
PAPERS, supra note 123, at 346, 346. 
151 Id. 
152 Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (Dec. 11, 1827), in 11 MARSHALL 
PAPERS, supra note 17, at 60, 61. 
153 Id. 
154 Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story ( June 15, 1821), in 9 MARSHALL 
PAPERS, supra note 123, at 167, 167. 
155 Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (Sept. 18, 1821), in 9 MARSHALL 
PAPERS, supra note 123, at 183, 184-85. 
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dent of a state bank.156  On one rare occasion, Marshall was the dis-
penser rather than seeker of advice.  Replying to a question from 
Washington, he tentatively ventured the opinion that a bill of ex-
change drawn in one state of the union on a person residing in an-
other state would be considered an inland rather than a foreign bill.157  
Eight years later, however, Washington for the Supreme Court held 
that such bills were foreign.158  
D.  Defender of the Judiciary 
Aside from performing the formal and official duties of office—
presiding in court and conference and writing and delivering opin-
ions—Marshall believed that as Chief Justice he had a broader respon-
sibility to act as a statesman:  to be the representative, advocate, and 
defender of the federal judiciary.  He performed this role in various 
ways and settings, but always with resolute seriousness and sometimes 
with impassioned fervor. 
From the beginning, he seized the opportunity to gain the pub-
lic’s respect and good will at sessions of the U.S. circuit court.  What-
ever direct contact most Americans had with Supreme Court Justices 
in the early nineteenth century occurred during the sitting of the cir-
cuits.  Few were able to observe the Supreme Court in Washington, 
but many more could hear a Supreme Court Justice deliver a jury 
charge or pronounce a judgment on circuit.  Twice each year the citi-
zens of Richmond and Raleigh had a chance to see Chief Justice Mar-
shall in action. 
Because criminal business was always first on the docket, circuit 
court sessions opened with the convening of the grand jury and the 
delivery of the charge.  During the 1790s, federal grand jury charges 
had been occasions for circuit-riding Supreme Court Justices to make 
major speeches that not only instructed the jurors concerning the 
criminal law but also addressed broader issues of law and politics.  The 
Justices regarded it as their solemn duty to inculcate political virtue 
among the people, to act as “republican schoolmasters” by teaching 
156 Letter from John Marshall to Bushrod Washington (May 28, 1822), in 9 
MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 123, at 203, 203. 
157 Letter from John Marshall to Bushrod Washington ( July 13, 1821), in 9 
MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 123, at 180, 180. 
158 See Buckner v. Finley, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 586, 590 (1829) (“[B]ills drawn in one of 
these states, upon persons living in any other of them, partake of the character of for-
eign bills, and ought so to be treated.”). 
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the principles of patriotism and good citizenship.159  It was customary 
for their charges to be published in the newspapers.  As party conflicts 
between Federalists and Republicans heated up during that decade, 
however, federal grand jury charges began to cross the line from de-
fense of government to defense of the administration in power and 
denunciation of its political opponents.160
Mindful of the extent to which partisan harangues on circuit 
(Chase was a prime offender) had sullied the federal judiciary’s repu-
tation, Chief Justice Marshall gave early notice of a more cautious ju-
dicial posture in his own grand jury charges.  He intended to use these 
occasions to foster his policy of withdrawing the judiciary from the po-
litical arena and confining its activities to matters strictly judicial.  In 
Richmond in May 1803, for example, the Chief Justice drew praise 
from the leading Republican newspaper for delivering “a pertinent 
charge to the Grand Jury, strictly within the limits of his official duty.”  
To contrast this charge, the newspaper continued, “with the infamous 
political degeneracy which marked every sentence of that lately deliv-
ered by Judge Chase in Baltimore, would be to condemn the latter as 
a shameless dereliction.”161  Earlier, on his first North Carolina circuit, 
Marshall delivered a charge that was praised for its appropriateness in 
fully explaining the grand jurors’ duties “without the least political in-
termixture.”162  The Chief Justice not only stuck to the judicial straight 
and narrow but took the further precaution of refusing newspaper 
publication of his charges.  In declining one paper’s request for a 
copy of his “elegant and learned charge,” Marshall explained “that he 
had laid it down as a rule from which he did not intend to depart, not 
to allow his charges to be published.”163
Over the course of many years, Chief Justice Marshall, whether sit-
ting in Washington, Richmond, or Raleigh, sought to build up the 
people’s trust in the federal judiciary as an impartial institution solely 
concerned with deciding cases according to strict legal principles.  
Nowhere was this task more difficult than in his native state of Vir-
ginia, which throughout his tenure was firmly under the sway of states’ 
159 See Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 SUP. CT. 
REV. 127, 156 (“Members of the pre-Marshall Supreme Court while on circuit may 
fairly be called ‘teachers to the citizenry.’”). 
160 CASTO, supra note 19, at 126-29. 
161 EXAMINER (Richmond, Va.), May 25, 1803. 
162 RALEIGH REG. & N.C. STATE GAZETTE, Jan. 4, 1803, at 3. 
163 N.C. MINERVA, Jan. 4, 1803, at 3. 
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rights Republican orthodoxy.  After the early crisis of 1801 to 1805,164 
the most serious challenges to federal judicial authority arose in Vir-
ginia.  In 1815, the Virginia Court of Appeals refused to acknowledge 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s mandate in an 1813 case, declaring section 
25 of the Judiciary Act unconstitutional.165  This prompted the Su-
preme Court to reaffirm, in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, its constitutional 
authority to revise state court judgments involving a federal ques-
tion.166  States’ rights Virginians were still smarting from Martin when 
Marshall in 1819 delivered the Court’s opinion in McCulloch v. Mary-
land.167  From the moment it was published, Virginia newspapers 
unleashed a torrent of hostile criticism of the opinion as a construc-
tive usurpation of the rights of the states that would soon result in the 
imposition of a consolidated national government.  “This opinion 
must be controverted and exposed,” one editorialist wrote.  “Virginia 
has proved herself the uniform friend of state rights—again, she is 
called upon to come forth!”168
These attacks so alarmed Marshall that he undertook an extraju-
dicial defense of McCulloch in a series of newspaper essays under the 
noms de plume “A Friend to the Union” and “A Friend of the Consti-
tution.”169  He was motivated by growing apprehension that the ani-
mosity generated by McCulloch was merely the start of a broader as-
sault on the Constitution and the Union itself aimed at its most 
vulnerable point, the federal judiciary.  “Hostility to the Union, must 
cease to be guided by its usual skill,” he wrote in his first “Friend to 
the Union” essay, “when it fails to select the weakest department as 
that through which a breach may be effected.”170  His overriding fear 
was that the unleashing of the “antifederal spirit of Virginia”171 would 
produce defiant resolutions by the Virginia General Assembly similar 
to those of 1798 and 1799 in response to the Alien and Sedition Acts.  
164 See supra Part II.A. 
165 Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 1, 58 (1815). 
166 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 342-51 (1816). 
167 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
168 Editorial Note, Essays Defending McCulloch v. Maryland, in 8 MARSHALL PAPERS, 
supra note 94, at 282, 282 (citation omitted). 
169 The newspaper essays attacking McCulloch and Marshall’s essays defending the 
opinion are collected in JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND (Ge-
rald Gunther ed., 1969).  Marshall’s essays can also be found in 8 MARSHALL PAPERS, 
supra note 94, at 287-308, 318-34, 335-52, 353-63. 
170 A Friend to the Union, No. I (Apr. 24, 1819), reprinted in 8 MARSHALL PAPERS, su-
pra note 94, at 287, 288. 
171 Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (Apr. 28, 1819), in 8 MARSHALL PA-
PERS, supra note 94, at 309, 309. 
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The consequence might be the emasculation of the Supreme Court 
and other measures that would effectively dismantle the federal gov-
ernment. 
To protect his anonymity, Marshall sent his essays to his friend 
and colleague Justice Washington, who arranged for their publication.  
He wrote them in response to pieces by “Amphictyon” and “Hamp-
den.”  Hampden, as Marshall and everyone in Virginia knew, was the 
redoubtable Spencer Roane, eminent judge of Virginia’s Court of Ap-
peals, an opponent of the Constitution in 1788, and an outspoken 
champion of states’ rights in resisting the Supreme Court’s mandate 
in 1813.  In Hampden (Roane), the Chief Justice recognized a bold 
and formidable opponent who went far beyond Amphictyon in im-
peaching the integrity and legitimacy of the judiciary department.  
What must have particularly rankled Marshall was Hampden’s conten-
tion that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to decide cases in-
volving a clash of powers between the state and general governments.  
In all, he wrote nine numbers of “A Friend of the Constitution” to re-
fute Roane’s charges.172
Marshall carried his defense of the judiciary beyond the pages of 
the newspapers.  To make sure his message got to the right people, he 
directed his essays to be placed “in the hands of some respectable 
members” of the Virginia legislature.173  As he feared, resolutions con-
demning the bank decision were introduced in the House of Dele-
gates, one of which instructed the state’s senators and representatives 
to procure a constitutional amendment creating a separate tribunal 
for deciding all questions involving a conflict between the powers of 
the federal and state governments.  However, the legislature closed its 
session without taking any official action, an indication that Marshall’s 
defense had its effect.174
The Supreme Court’s vulnerability to a hostile Congress, particu-
larly in the form of proposals to reduce its appellate jurisdiction, was a 
source of perennial concern to Marshall.  In 1823, he worked quietly 
and brilliantly behind the scenes to defeat one such measure.  In reac-
tion to the Court’s invalidation of Kentucky’s occupying claimant laws 
in Green v. Biddle,175 a Kentucky senator introduced legislation that 
would have increased the number of Supreme Court Justices to ten 
172 Editorial Note, supra note 168, at 284-86. 
173 Letter from John Marshall to Bushrod Washington (ca. June 28, 1819), in 8 
MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 94, at 317, 317. 
174 Editorial Note, supra note 168, at 286. 
175 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823). 
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and required the concurrence of at least seven Justices in cases involv-
ing the validity of state laws or acts of Congress.176  This proposal elic-
ited from Marshall a private communication to his friend Henry Clay, 
the influential Speaker of the House of Representatives.  Clay, as the 
Chief Justice well understood, had reason to be displeased with the 
ruling in Green, having argued in favor of the validity of Kentucky’s 
laws in the Supreme Court.177  Marshall accordingly composed his let-
ter with great tact and sensitivity—and a little humor as well.  Assum-
ing “the privilege of age to utter wise sayings somewhat like proverbs 
.  .  . as a substitute for that powerful and convincing argument which 
it has lost the faculty of making,” the Chief Justice observed that “it is 
among the most dangerous things in legislation to enact a general law 
of great and extensive influence to effect a particular object.”178  He 
then went on to suggest the “serious inconvenience” that would result 
“from a very numerous supreme court.”179  More alarming was the re-
quirement of a supermajority to decide constitutional questions, 
which in effect would prevent the Court from exercising judicial re-
view of legislation.  A “conscientious legislator” could never assent to a 
measure that would defeat an object obviously contemplated by the 
Constitution:  “It is I think difficult to read that instrument attentively 
without feeling the conviction that it intends to provide a tribunal for 
every case of collision between itself and a law, so far as such case can 
assume a form for judicial enquiry . . . .”180  The Chief Justice’s timely 
intervention no doubt had its effect.  Thanks in no small part to his 
superb political skills, neither this proposal nor other attempts to curb 
the Court’s power were enacted into law during his chief justiceship. 
The Chief Justice’s role as the judiciary’s champion took yet an-
other form in 1829, when Marshall, at the age of seventy-four, served 
as a delegate to the Virginia constitutional convention.  Here he 
proved to be a tenacious defender of judicial independence, showing 
no disposition to compromise when he perceived a threat to this vital 
principle.  As chairman of the Judiciary Committee, he presented a 
report providing for judicial tenure during good behavior, accompa-
nied by a clause specifying that “no modification or abolition of any 
176 1 WARREN, supra note 21, at 663-64. 
177 Id. at 638-39. 
178 Letter from John Marshall to Henry Clay (Dec. 22, 1823), in 9 MARSHALL 
PAPERS, supra note 123, at 365, 365. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. at 365-66. 
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Court shall be construed to deprive any Judge thereof of this office.”181  
Marshall’s motive was to guard against a possible construction 
founded on Congress’s 1802 repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801.  The 
repeal had abolished the federal circuit courts, composed of sixteen 
new judgeships, established by the 1801 act.  Marshall strenuously de-
nied that the 1802 repeal was an authoritative precedent for the legis-
lature’s power to abolish the office of a judge by abolishing the 
judge’s court.182
This clause encountered much resistance, requiring all of Mar-
shall’s legislative skill and eloquence to preserve it.  No doubt, too, his 
venerable dignity as Chief Justice of the United States helped him win 
support.  In speeches he patiently tried to explain why an uncompro-
mising adherence to the principle of judicial independence was so vi-
tally necessary: 
Advert, sir, to the duties of a Judge.  He has to pass between the Gov-
ernment and the man whom that Government is prosecuting:  between 
the most powerful individuals in the community, and the poorest and 
most unpopular.  It is of the last importance, that in the exercise of these 
duties, he should observe the utmost fairness.  Need I press the necessity 
of this? Does not every man feel that his own personal security and the 
security of his property depends on that fairness? The Judicial Depart-
ment comes home in its effects to every man’s fireside:  it passes on his 
property, his reputation, his life, his all.  Is it not, to the last degree im-
portant, that he should be rendered perfectly and completely independ-
ent, with nothing to influence or to controul him but God and his con-
science?
183
If judges could be removed at pleasure, he asked, 
will any lawyer of distinction come upon your bench?  No, Sir.  I have al-
ways thought, from my earliest youth till now, that the greatest scourge 
an angry Heaven ever inflicted upon an ungrateful and a sinning people, 
was an ignorant, a corrupt, or a dependent Judiciary.  Will you draw 
down this curse upon Virginia?”
184
Marshall’s resort to such uncharacteristic rhetorical flourishes 
showed that the debate over judicial tenure roused his deepest feel-
ings, engaging his mind and heart in equal measure. 
181 Draft of Report of Judiciary Committee (Oct. 12, 1829), in 11 MARSHALL 
PAPERS, supra note 17, at 279, 279. 
182 Debate on Judiciary ( Jan. 13, 1830), in 11 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 17, at 
337, 337-38, 341 n.1. 
183 Debate on Judiciary (Dec. 11, 1829), in 11 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 17, at 
310, 311. 
184 Id. at 317. 
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CONCLUSION 
Marshall’s long tenure, spanning the American federal republic’s 
first generations, provided him the opportunity to define—indeed, in-
vent—the office of Chief Justice in ways that his three short-term 
predecessors could not have done and that foreclosed the same op-
portunity to his successors.  He set standards, established procedures, 
and created expectations that proved enduring, transcending the 
unique personal and historical circumstances in which they origi-
nated.  After Marshall, Supreme Court eras would be known by the 
names of their Chief Justices.  None of his successors has matched his 
record as the Supreme Court’s effective as well as nominal leader.  
Marshall, writes a recent commentator, was “the prototype of the suc-
cessful chief justice.”185  A natural leader, endowed with a keen and 
supple intellect, an attractive personality, an amiable disposition, a 
moderate, non-doctrinaire temperament that was amenable to com-
promise (except on the principle of judicial independence), and a 
comprehensive knowledge of human affairs, Marshall embodied the 
qualities that Americans continue to prize in a Chief Justice.  As a 
Court nominee, Marshall lacked “judicial experience,” but this was 
scarcely a disqualification in 1801.  Even today, Americans are ambiva-
lent about nominees drawn from the cloistered ranks of the federal 
judiciary who might be wanting in “real world” experience.186
President Adams nominated Marshall to be Chief Justice not sim-
ply because his Secretary of State was a distinguished practitioner of 
law but, more importantly, because this lawyer was a statesman of 
proven worth, a public servant who had performed in various capaci-
ties, legislative and executive, state and federal.  In explaining Mar-
shall’s successful leadership of the Court, contemporary and present-
day commentators have singled out the Virginian’s practical, common 
sense wisdom acquired as a man of affairs.  Marshall, wrote a reviewer 
of Story’s eulogy of the Chief Justice, studied “things” rather than 
“books”; he subjected his opinions “to the test of experience”; he pos-
sessed the rare “power of seeing things exactly as they are, without 
185 Jeffrey Rosen, The New Boss, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 18, 2005, at 19, 20. 
186 Peter Baker, Alito Nomination Sets Stage for Ideological Battle, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 
2005, at A1.  Baker writes, “The same president who touted Miers a month ago as a 
nominee with real-world experience far removed from ‘the judicial monastery’ yester-
day emphasized Alito’s lengthy history on the bench, noting that he ‘has more prior 
judicial experience than any Supreme Court nominee in more than 70 years.’”  Id. at 
A6. 
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confusion, distortion or discoloring.”187  Accordingly, Americans 
should not “regret the hours which Chief Justice Marshall spent in the 
camp and the senate, or wish that he had rather devoted them to soli-
tary communing with the sages of the law.  The wisdom which the 
former course gave him, was of more importance to his country, than 
the learning with which the latter might have furnished him.”188  If 
prior judicial experience has in our time become a prerequisite for a 
Chief Justice (or any Supreme Court Justice), still the hope is that 
such a person will also bring a knowledge and experience of the wider 
world to the task.  The Marshall prototype continues to exert its influ-
ence in this respect.  An admiring twentieth-century Supreme Court 
Justice gave voice to this sentiment in writing that Marshall’s 
“[e]xperience of men and affairs” as a state legislator, member of 
Congress, diplomat, and secretary of state “doubtless reinforced a 
temperament to which abstract theorizing was never congenial.”189  He 
praised Marshall’s “hardheaded appreciation of the complexities of 
government, particularly in a federal system.”190
Marshall commenced his judicial career with a deep understand-
ing of the nature and boundaries of legislative, executive, and judicial 
power.  He remained throughout acutely sensitive to the potential and 
limits of judicial power in a government that was both republican and 
federal.  A man of the eighteenth century, he believed that popular 
government could work tolerably well so long as it operated under a 
constitutional system of checks and balances and produced leaders of 
excellent character, distinguished for sound and discriminating 
judgment, and disinterested attachment to the public interest.  By 
1801, he was doubtful, and in subsequent years became increasingly 
skeptical, that the legislative and executive—so enmeshed in partisan 
politics—were by themselves up to the job of maintaining constitu-
tional government.  Marshall defined the prerogatives of the office of 
Chief Justice and exploited them in the firm conviction that the judi-
cial branch was the best hope for preserving the orderly and virtuous 
republic.  More than anyone, he was responsible for implanting the 
perception of the Supreme Court as an impartial umpire standing 
above the partisan fray, a repository of wisdom and virtue, where rea-
187 Chief Justice Marshall, 42 N. AM. REV. 217, 225 (1836), available at http:// 
cdl.library.cornell.edu/cgi-bin/moa/sgml/moa-idx?notisid=ABQ7578-0042-11. 
188 Id. at 226. 
189 Felix Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, in THAYER, HOLMES, 
AND FRANKFURTER ON MARSHALL, supra note 1, at 145. 
190 Id. 
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son, reflection, and disinterested judgment hold sway.  This percep-
tion, the product of an eighteenth-century sensibility, has essentially 
survived into the twenty-first century and remains Marshall’s greatest 
legacy. 
